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| Australasian Journal of Philosophy; Vol 97, N°1 (2019) https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1435698 |
Author:
- Badura, Christopher; RUB Research School & Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum; christopher.badura@ruhr-uni-bochum.de; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2481-8192
- Berto, Francesco; Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3246-657X
Keywords: truth in fiction, impossible worlds, inconsistent fiction, Sylvan's box, belief revision.
Abstract: We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
Language: English.
Publication: 27 Feb, 2018
Volumen: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 97, N°1
