 |
Philosophical Studies; Vol 178, issue 3 (2021) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01451-w |
Autor: Michel-Antoine Xhignesse; Department of Philosophy, Capilano University, Fir 404, 2055 Purcell Way, North Vancouver; michelxhignesse@capilanou.ca.
Keywords: Auctorial say-so, contradiction, interpretation, story-telling, says-is gap, truth in fiction, universal fictions.
Abstract: It is widely agreed that fiction is necessarily incomplete, but some recent work postulates the existence of universal fictions—stories according to which every thing is true. Building such a storyis supposedly straight forward: author scan either assert that every thing is true in their story, define a complement function that does the assertoric work for them, or, most compellingly, write a story combining a contradiction with the principle of explosion. The case for universal fictions thus turns on the intuitive priority we as sign to the law of non-contradiction. My goal in this paper is to show that our critical and reflective literary practices set constraints on story-telling which preclude universal fictions. I will raise fours tumbling blocks for universal fictionalists: (1) the gap between say in gand making true, (2) our actual interpretive reactions to story level contradictions,(3) the criteria we accept for what counts as a story in our literary practices, and (4) the undesirability of the universal fictionalist’s closure principles.
Language: English
Publication: 20 abril 2020
Volumen: Philosophical Studies; Vol 178, issue 3 (2021)
